…no not of Europe if we do the wrong thing but of yet another Irish Euro Referendum. We really are gluttons for punishment. 1973, SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice (twice) and now Lisbon twice. That’s eight versions of more or less, give or take, the same bleedin’ question! I regularly explain to people overseas that if you can’t explain the EU’s (or any particular treaties) benefits simply to people on the street then it’s not worth having. There seems to be only so far you can take this though. “It’s all vey complicated people say” OK here’s a shortened version “don’t patronise me” they reply. The Title by Title version produced here took about 2-3 hours overall…seriously it’s not that bad.

It would be nice to have a final trump card to play in the campaign or unearth a new article to win the day. The truth is far more boring and this was never the idea of the blog. Lisbon is a modest progressive set of reforms which will make the EU more efficient and democratic that’s still really it. It seems anything can be put on a poster now in referendum campaigns. Why dies Europe need 8 referendums but NAMA, the Finance Act and The Mc Carthy report don’t. Maybe we need to think it out again.

The constant fascination with what happens if we both No is a bit annoying but Yes campaigners have finally realised the honest answer of “nobody knows” is better than the Euro bogey man will get us. In fact the Euro bogey man might be preferable as we could send Joe Higgins, Patricia Mc Kenna and Coir out to defend us with non militarised pea shooters! The truth is probably more worrying, nobody really knows.

Business as usual? Maybe for a year or two but the push for reform will continue and no amount of whinging about being the only country to have referendums will matter when the changes come. I would certainly concur that enhanced co-operation will be used more under the current treaties and after that who knows. But don’t we want to know? Isn’t political stability and certainty an element of economic recovery?

Another blogger has said it’s like throwing rocks at the fire brigade…I like the analogy. Anyway do we want another 5 or six years talking about institutions and voting weights and QMV. What people want is the EU to help solve the big problems that member states can’t deal with like climate change, cross border crime and unemployment. Settling the interminable institutional questions will allow this to happen.

I’m not convinced the general standard of debate was much improved this time not to mention the overall knowledge or understanding of Europe but we can but hope. About 7,500 people happened by hear though so hopefully that was useful.

Title I sets out some of the more technical features of the institutions bearing in mind the TEU has described them generally. The new double majority voting procedure is set out with 55% of countries and 65% of population. The no side only represent one side of this equation of course…could this be deliberate. With the need for a majority of states Ireland effectively has the same number of votes at the Council as the largest members. Of course QMV is rarely used and the new double majority may make it easier to pass a limited number of proposals. Similarly Ireland tends to be on the “winning side” in QMV votes more often than not.

More detail is provided on the legal acts of the EU and the different legislative procedures. Generally these are simplified. Much of what already exists is formalised and codified. Again provisions on advisory bodies is codified.

Title II covers financial provisions. This covers budgeting, own resources and combating fraud. There is little new in it

Title III covers enhanced co-operation. This sets out in more detail the provisions covered in the TEU

Part 7 covers general and final provisions such as staffing, overseas territories and languages, it is quite technical and there is little new in it.

Protocols

These are an important area of the treaty and can be seen as appendices with the same legal power, usually giving more detail on a specific area.

The Role of National Parliaments receives a full protocol and sets out how national parliaments are to have a greater involvement in the legislative process. Much of this is new or at least developed. Similarly the Protocol On The Application Of The Principles Of Subsidiarity And Proportionality is changed and developed. This covers the so called yellow card procedure for national parliaments.

A Protocol on the Euro Group provides for informal meetings of those countries whose currency is the Euro. There is a significant Protocol on integrating the Schengen Acquis (rules) into the treaty. Ireland has an opt out/in in this area as it does in the Protocol on Art 22a and 26 of the TEU covering the Common Travel Area and another on the Area of Freedom Security and Justice relating to police and judicial co-operation.

There is another Protocol on Permanent Structured Co-operation this covers the form of enhanced co-operation used in security and defence matters, it is similar but with more safeguards built in due to the sensitivity. There is also a specific Protocol on Acceding to the European Charter of Human Rights and on The Internal Market And Competition

The UK and Poland have a specific Protocol on the Charter of Fundamental Rights that they seemed to think was necessary and a Protocol on Shared Competencies

There is a new Protocol emphasising the importance of Services of General Economic Interest and the introduction of the New System of QMV and Transitional Provisions

A number of protocols contain only the most basic changes in terms of name of minor issues these are protocols on; The ECJ, The ECB, The European Investment Bank, The Location and Seats of Institutions!, Privileges and Immunities, Excessive Deficits, Convergence Criteria for the Euro, The UK and the Euro, Denmark and the Euro, Other opt outs for Denmark, Currency in French Overseas Territories, Crossing external borders, Asylum, Co-operation with the WEU, The Netherlands Antilles, Property in Denmark, Public Broadcasting, treatment of certain social security benefits, on economic, and social and territorial cohesion, Greenland, abortion in Ireland, The European Coal and Steel Community

Part Five of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union covers the Unions external actions. These are governed by the principals set out in the Treaty on European Union as amended

Title II covers the common commercial policy the process whereby the EU acts internationally in the economic sphere. Again this is to be consistent with the original TEU principles. There is some extension of QMV but notably not to all areas for example sensitive agreements on social, education and health services are excluded. The European Parliament is also given an enhanced role.

Title III covers cooperation with third countries and humanitarian aid. Again the principles earlier outlined govern this area. Development policy is to have as it’s main objective “the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty. Again there is some extension of QMV.

Title IV covers restrictive actions, effectively sanctions and Title V allows the EU enter in to international agreements (not a new provision)

Title VI covers relations with international organisations such as the U.N., third countries and EU delegations.

Title VII outlines the new solidarity clause; this is effectively a political declaration that member states will assist each other in the even of a natural disaster or terrorist attack. This is also covered by one of the legal guarantees in Brussels in June which makes clear member states themselves decide how this will be made operational.

Probably the most fascinating aspect of referendums on Europe is the constant evoking of the doomsday scenarios. Seriously “The Sky Will Fall In” rings just a bit narrow after it’s outing in the SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam, Nice twice and now Lisbon twice. In fairness the Yes side can fall into this trap too and promise the sun the moon and the stars in every treaty but as No votes have only come into vogue more recently they have more form.

The unfortunate and humdrum reality of it is Lisbon is quite a mundane and straightforward affair. A few changes to the institutions, greater democracy for sure, a bit simpler when consolidated and a few streamlined effects. We will probably know what the AG said about the need for a referendum, it may have been connected to the High Representative on Foreign Policy or the new provisions for amendment although it is hard to see, possibly a more permanent president of the European Council. Interestingly the latter hasn’t featured at all in public debate.

The real treaty to get worked up about was Maastricht. This was where the EU was established and the Euro finally rolled out. This was a serious treaty with serious ramifications. Does anybody remember the debate? Somehow we managed to get it all tied up with abortion and even run three separate abortion referendums on the same say!

The EU manages to get completely hung up on institutional naval gazing all the time. This is hugely problematic for Yes campaigners as they have to get people worked up about arcane and technocratic issues. Other countries just vote on these in parliament.

In separate posts I’m compiling an title by title analysis of the treaty which hopefully will be complete before polling day. I now am confident about this as the vast bulk of the work on the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union involves three words repeated over and again – “no change here”. Apart form the extension of QMV, provided for in the Crotty case, there are no significant changes to whole swathes of the treaties. The changes to institutions and some of the declaratory stuff all sites in the first short Treaty on European Union.

In relaity we are being asked to believe that a body that has been immensely positive for Irleand is suddenly going to chnage and turn on us because of this treaty and there are somehow parts of it which are out to get us. Eoghan Harris puts it well in his analogy of the EU as a marriage!

On another private forum I’m involved with this came up for debate. Those arguing for a No vote clearly didn’t realise this and where quoting whole chunks of text that are unchanged. When it was drawn to their attention they went on to say that people are voting on all the articles again…this form people who think a second referendum is undemocratic!

The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU is the new name for the Treaty Establishing the EC, effectively the amended version of the original Treaty of Rome. This is really the historic meat of European integration emerging form the establishment of the single market. Given many of these articles have existed for a long time they tend to arise in debate even though often there is no substantial change to what has existed.

Part One gives equal value to the two treaties

Title I sets out the categories and areas of competence of the EU. This is a simplification and clarification of this area. The respective competences of the member state and the Union are set out including exclusive competences of both and shared competences. This is quite a useful check list and of course is legally enforceable by the ECJ.

Areas where policies are co-ordinated are set out and areas where the Union can support, co-ordinate and supplement member states actions

Title II covers provisions having general application, these are effectively cross cutting provisions which shadow and govern other parts of the treaty. These include consistency, equality, a high level of employment, social protection, combating discrimination, environmental protection, consumer protection, animal welfare. There is specific provision on services of general economic interest (public services). Openness of decision making, access to documents, holding meetings in public, personal data. Recognition of national approaches to churches and a dialogue with churches is provided for.

Part two covers non discrimination and citizenship.

There are robust provisions on anti-discrimination. European citizenship is restated and continues to be additional to citizenship of member states, their rights and duties are clearly set out, including free movement, voting, diplomatic protection, citizens initiative, European ombudsman, languages,

Part Three covers Union Policies and internal actions

Title I specifically covers the Internal Market. This has been a cornerstone of the EC/EEC since its foundation.

Title II restates provisions on free movement of goods and customs union. Possibly exemptions are provided for in Article 37. There is very little change here.

Title III restates much of the provision on agriculture and fisheries, the objectives of the CAP are clearly set out. There is little change here but the European Parliament is brought in to the legislative process.

Title IV covers free movement of persons, services and capital. There are no major changes except some extension of QMV

Title V of Part 3 Covers The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Many of these provisions were originally introduced at the Treaty of Amsterdam to enhance the notions of freedom of movement. Much of the common provisions represent recodifying of language. One of the new provisions relates to combating the financial side of terrorism. Ireland has secured an opt out or more accurately the right to opt in in much of police and judicial co-operation, immigration and asylum along with continuing an opt out on the schengen passport free travel area. The main difference here is Ireland has expressed a willingness to be part of these arrangements if it can. The opt out gives the Government and the Oireachtas the right to decide and this is contained in the wording.

Much of this area comes in to the “community method” i.e. with a role for the parliament and the ECJ as opposed to the previous intergovernmental method. In fact this is the main change in this whole area

Title VI concerning transport contains no major changes bar some moves to QMV

Title VII covers taxation and competition again there are very few substantive changes here bar one or two moves to QMV, Ireland has also received a legal guarantee on taxation remaining a national competence

Title VIII on economic and monetary policy again contains few changes except moves to QMV

Titles IX, X, XI, XII, XIII on employment, social policy, the ESF, youth sport, education and culture contain no major changes bar some moves to QMV

Similarly Titles XIV, XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII, XIX Public Health, Consumer Protection, Trans European Networks, Industry, economic, social and territorial cohesion, research and technological development and space follow the same pattern

Title XX sees an additional aim of combating climate change added to the treaties. Title XXI and XXII provides for greater co-operation in the area of energy policy and tourism

Title XXIII covers civil protection in areas such as natural disastrous where member state actions will be assisted in a speedy fashion

Title XXIV covers administrative co-operation

Part Four of the Treaty covers association of the overseas countries and territories, there are no major changes

With thanks to the IIEA www.iiea.com

Title IV of the Treaty on European Union contains only Article 20 on enhanced co-operation. This is a system whereby a certain number of member states can go ahead and co-operate in certain areas. Safeguards are laid down with the details set out later in the TFEU and a full protocol is also included. It has existed since 1996 but has never been used. However it is reasonable to say it may become more common if Lisbon is not ratified by all states.

Title V contains the general provisions on the External Action of the Union. Even with this new title the reality is very little has changed on this area although one would hardly think so from the debate.

Article 21 sets out the principles governing the external actions of the EU, notably democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the U.N. Charter

Article 22 provides for the EU to define it’s interests and objectives in this area on the basis of the values in the previous article and this is done unanimously by the European Council

Article 23 in specifically defining a common and security policy reiterates that this must be consistent with the earlier values

Article 24 sets out the aim of a common defence policy and the possibility of a common defence, the later is prohibited by the Irish Constitution and the June Guarantees also say these matters are for Ireland alone to decide. Unanimity is set out as the normal decision making process for the most important decisions and generally the European Parliament and the ECJ do not have a role as these are seen as the most sensitive areas where national positions are respected. The role of the High Representative is reaffirmed as members are expected to support the policies agreed. This has been seen as a sensitive area for Ireland and there are several safeguards such as unanimity in decision making, the principles which govern the external action, the provisions of our constitution and the Brussels Guarantees.

Article 25 provides some of the detailed mechanisms for the common foreign and security policy

Article 26 sets out the role of the European Council in this area

Article 27 sets out the role of the High Rep. in leading the common and security policy and an external action service

Article 28 provides for decision making in the area for operations

Article 29 provides for thematic and geographic positions which member states should support having adopted

Article 30 provides for bringing items to the Council and the calling of meetings

Article 31 re-iterates unanimity as the decision making method for the most important decisions and set out the areas where it will not apply these are generally in the area of implementation and a member state can prevent QMV here if it is seen as a vital national interest

Article 32 provides that members should consult each other about actions they may take and keep each other informed

Article 33 allows for the appointment of special representatives

Article 34 provides for co-operation and co-ordination in other international organisations

Article 35 provides for co-operation between the diplomatic and consular services of member states

Article 36 sets out the role of the European Parliament in the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Article 37 allows the Union to conclude international agreements

Article 38 outlines the role and function of the Political and Security Committee, a specialist committee in this area

Article 39 provides for action in the area of data protection consistent with the TFEU

Article 40 provides that the CFSP does not affect the division of powers between the Union and member states set out in the TFEU

Article 41 sets out who pays for what in this area

The European Security and Defence Policy has existed since 2003 and in all nearly 30 missions have been or are being undertaken. It is hard to locate any of those which would be inconsistent with Irish foreign policy values and indeed Ireland has been a prominent participant in many missions. A simple examination of the missions illustrates this http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_253_esr43-esdp-mission-update.pdf

Article 42 sets out the CSDP as a part of the CFSP. It sets out the role of the CSDP as being the operational side of the CFSP, common defence can only come about by unanimity. It is also set out that it will not prejudice the specific defence characteristics of member states a phrase Ireland originally had inserted in to the treaties. It provides for making forces available for missions and that members will improve heir capabilities. Despite claims there is no provision for extra defence spending and such a commitment could be met by refocussing or re-organising defences. Indeed much of this area is an exhortation rather than an enforceable commitment. Ireland has undergone much re-organising of defence forces and will probably continue to do so. Unanimity in all decisions on operations is once more reaffirmed. Assistance to other member states is provided for but must be consistent with member states policies. NATO membership is also respected in this area.

Article 43 sets out the types of tasks involved. These were originally known as the Petersberg Tasks and are largely in the area of peace-keeping and crisis management.

Article 44 allows for the entrustment of agreed tasks to specific member states or groups of member states

Article 45 covers the European Defence Agency (see earlier post). This is the provision of a Treaty basis for the agency which already exists.

Article 46 provides for structured co-operation a form of enhanced co-operation in this area but with different rules. It can be established by QMV but only for the missions established by unanimity and for the values set out earlier and consistent with the Petersberg Tasks

Article 47 says the Union has legal personality, in other words it can enter into agreements. While stated more clearly here this is not a new provision for example in the area of trade.

Article 48 has been debated a lot in both campaigns with the allegation that somehow the treaty becomes “self amending” notwithstanding the peculiar nature of this idea the concept has been less common in Lisbon II presumably because people have read the provisions. Indeed they were ably covered by Justice Frank Clarke on Morning Ireland. The Article effectively outlines two methods for amending the treaty one involving an Inter Governmental Conference and one which does not. Both methods however require ratification by member states in accordance with their own constitutional traditions. This effectively means referendums for major changes in Ireland.

No campaigners have said that some minor changes or the change to QMV in some areas can be done without a referendum. However the key is this can be done at the moment. Several minor changes can be made to treaties, the perfect example being accession treaties which Ireland currently ratifies without referendums. The Crotty case already has said moving to QMV was not a matter requiring a referendum but was covered by the 1973 accession referendum.

Europe is run by the elites or so we are told, faceless bureaucrats and those who want to dominate militarily. People who say this should have a chat with Pat Nash, a Christian Brothers educated Limerick man with a love of hurling and rugby, with very little background in the corridors of power in Brussels. Pat took a fairly traditional route in the 60’s becoming a cadet in the Irish Army, like many a few spells in the Lebanon followed. Pat climbed through the career structure focussing more on overseas missions.

In 2007 Lieutenant General Pat Nash became one of the most important people in European Security and Defence Policy. Of course two Irish people have in succession held the most senior positions in the European Commission but to have the commander of a major EU mission coming form a small neutral country was somewhat historic.

The political and military situation in Central Africa is complex and difficult. The whole world however spoke at one during 2007 saying that action was needed to deal with the situation in Darfur where millions of people were being displaced. Much of the impact of this was being felt in the neighbouring countries of Chad and The Central African Republic, both with their own internal problems.

The United Nations passed Resolution 1778 in September 2007 and both Chad and CAR requested assistance to deal with the situation. The resolution stressed the protection of civilians, aid organisations and the need to stabilise the security situation. Nash was faced with a huge challenge in putting together a force which eventually had forces form 26 countries including non EU countries, Albania, Russia and Croatia

The mission presented massive logistical and political difficulties all of which had to be resolved in double quick time. In a country about 6 times the size of Ireland there was 500km of proper road and practically zero infrastructure in terms of transport and air travel. While logistical miracles were performed many of the shortcomings in the EU security architecture were present such as the lack of a permanent OHQ, the absence of dedicated air lift capacity and sufficient dedicated medical support.

It was widely recognised as one of the most dangerous missions that Ireland had ever been involved with and a surge in rebel activity to the Chadian capital N’Djamane delayed the start by some weeks. The military patrols and operations were supported by economic development projects. From start to finish the mission was to last for one year until a U.N. mission could be assembled, the UN clearly recognised the EU’s ability to deploy more rapidly and effectively.

Interestingly Nash has commented that the civilian and democratic oversight of this mission was second to none and far superior to that seen in the United Nations. The mission has been recognised all around as being an enormous success particularly considering the huge risk and complexity involved. The United Nations have now taken on the longer term tasks in the area.

So this is the actual rather than the imagined reality of European Security and Defence Policy. I can’t see any of the militarism or large country dominance so often spoken of in Ireland. In the Political and Security Committee where all the major operational decisions are made Ireland has one vote the same as every other member state. The actual changes in security and defence policies in Lisbon are quite minor. The creation of a foreign minister (it’s not the term used in the treaty) is actually much more minor with the High Representative for Foreign Policy becoming a member of both the Council and Commission to bring the work of both bodies together. All major decisions remain to be made by unanimity.

The most striking thing about this whole area is the gulf between the reality and the fantasy. The EUFOR operation in Chad is only one of many and even a cursory glance at Bosnia, Kosovo and the Congo shows that the founding principles of the ESDP are being translated on the ground. So Yes campaigners must see security and defence policy as a plus not a minus in our approach to EU integration. The legal guarantees from our EU partners cement this view. The EDA is given legal standing in the Treaty and this is covered elsewhere on this site. Suffice it to say it will strengthen and improve this work and that must be welcomed by all.

http://www.raco.ie/signalpdfs/Signal_Sep_08/Command_and_Control.pdf

Surely one of the greatest things about politics and public life in this country is that we have a written constitution. A relatively simple document (not counting millions of pages of judgements which are effectively part of it), which of course gives rise to our referendums on Europe.

The Crotty Judgement is often misinterpreted as meaning we have to have a referendum on every treaty. A careful read of it shows this is not the case. It is more accurate to say that only major transfers of sovereignty or changes in the nature and reach of the EU require referendums. As the Government has never published or really commented on the AG’s advice in this area it is hard to know the precise reasons for each referendum.

However it is reasonably clear that having a written constitution increases our prediliction for European referendums. We have seen fit to vote 6 times in 25 years on Europe putting us top of the referendum charts, with Lisbon 2 being our seventh go at relatively similar issues.  

Such a fixation makes us prey for a whole load of others who have an interest in these topics. I suppose generally it is a good thing to have others take an interest and I don’t go along with the idea that it’s not anybody else’s business. However what I think most people would like to think was that outside involvement in a referendum here (remember SIPO makes it illegal for non Irish people to donate to a campaign) is at the invitation of Irish people or groups and respects some of the basics of our democracy and culture. In the end of the day I am far from convinced about it’s effectiveness anyway. Of late it is UK based groups that are showing a renewed interest in our debate. It’s a bit like the Battle of the Boyne all over again, English interests fighting out their European battles in Ireland.

Lisbon 2 promises to be a new watermark in this regard with UKIP and Nigel Farage promising to put in an appearance. UKIP of course welcomed the last Irish vote by using the national flag instead of beer mats in Kitty O’Sheas. A former leader opined that Ireland was a land of peasants and pixies and several of their MEPs have been prosecuted for various types of fraud and malpractice…takes all sorts I suppose

The Daily Mail’s Irish edition has similarly thrown it’s lot in with the Irish No campaign, along with the Trade Union Unite. While Unite have several Irish members they still like to categorise us as a region of somewhere…presumably the UK. The BNP European Election manifesto incidentally committed them to re-incorporating Ireland into the UK

Again I’m sanguine enough about all this and don’t believe in the little Irelander approach. What do these guys feel they will bring to the debate? Are our own naysayers not up to the job given that they have actually won two referendums.

Well one thing some of them bring is a good shot of honesty. UKIP state clearly that they wish to withdraw from the EU. Yes I said withdraw form the EU. Now nobody amongst the Irish No campaign on the surface advocates that. Of course they have campaigned against every referendum to date but they are all very clear in saying that the like Europe as it is. That’s quite a statement if you opposed all the building blocks that make it what it is like QMV, supremacy of EU law and the common institutions.

So roll on UKIP and their hangers on, let’s have the real debate that our No side won’t have. Under the surface many No campaigners don’t want the EU as it is, they oppose any move to QMV which brought us workers rights, better environmental legislation and the single market. They oppose the very notion of the EU Commisison which watches out for smaller states and pulls up the Microsoft’s of this world, they want only co-operation amongst independent states which is a charter for domination by the large states. They want no military role thus abandoning Bosnia, Kosovo and many more to the ethnic cleansers.

At least UKIP have the honesty to come out and say what the real agenda is, to leave the EU and to halt it’s progress. If only the Irish No campaign accorded us with the same honesty.

For years the European project has struggled with the idea that there is a democratic deficit a it’s heart. From the outset I must say I don’t go along with this and I think it’s yet another example of those who favour European integration conceding far to much in debate to those who do not. The EU has the only existing multi-national directly elected parliament in the world and moreover it functions primarily along party rather than national lines. Fortunately those who argued it lacked any real power know that argument has been simply redundant for many years.

To cut a long story short I tend to go along with the German Constitutional court, anyone who expects a replica of a nation state’s democracy in the EU will be inevitably disappointed but anyone comparing it to other international organisations will be overwhelmed. The institutional balance between the European interest (Commission), Member State (Council) and Citizen (Parliament) is central to how Europe works.

Anyhow politics being what it is the Convention which drafted much of Lisbon and it’s precursor put a lot of work into addressing the perceived democratic deficit and much of the result can be seen in the new title two of the Treaty of European Union

Article 9 is a basic statement of citizenship and equality indicating that European citizenship which has existed since Maastricht is additional to national citizenship

Article 10 set’s out clearly the EU’s commitment to representative democracy and how the institutions represent citizens

Article 11 commits the Commission to consulting civil society and introduces the citizens initiative where one million citizens can petition the Commission, a new concept in the EU

Article 12 sets out the role of national parliaments. This was an area which received a lot of attention from the Convention as it was seen to be a major element in addressing the perceived democratic deficit and in reconnecting the EU with it’s citizens. This is further added to in different roles in different policy areas and with a specific protocol on National Parliaments

Most of the provisions of this Title are new

Title III: Institutions

Article 13 serves to outline directly and simply the different institutions of the EU and that they can only act within the powers conferred on them

Article 14 sets out a basic description of the Parliament and it’s role and function

Article 15 sets out the role and function of the European Council (heads of state and Government) including the new provision for a more permanent president

Article 16 sets out the role and function of the Council of Ministers including the new QMV regime worth quoting in full

“As from 1 November 2014, a qualified majority shall be defined as at least 55 % of the members of the Council, comprising at least fifteen of them and representing Member States comprising at least 65 % of the population of the Union.

A blocking minority must include at least four Council members, failing which

the qualified majority shall be deemed attained.

The other arrangements governing the qualified majority are laid down in Article

205(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.”

This provision has given rise to key claims by the no side in the campaign, however like many of the so called “complex” aspects of the Treaty the wording is relatively straightforward. This whole area will be the subject of another entry but for now some basic points should be noted. There are two (well technically three) aspects to QMV, not one. Anybody concentrating on one only is fibbing. The Convention was asked to simplify this area and simplify it did. The previous system was apples and this is oranges so it is practically impossible to compare them…as I say more anon.

Article 17 covers the role and function of the Commission, including it’s president and the way it is selected (notably allowing for a reversion to one Commissioner per member state as decided at the June Brussels Summit

Article 18 provides for the new High Representative on Foreign Policy, this position is already provided for however the Treaty makes some changes principally the idea of “double hatting” i.e. the High Representative will be a member of both Council and Commission effectively becoming the EU’s chief diplomat. This brings together what are currently disparate areas such as intergovernmental decisions on foreign policy and aid policy for example.

Article 19 sets out the role and function of the European Court of Justice

Again much of this text is new