Europe is run by the elites or so we are told, faceless bureaucrats and those who want to dominate militarily. People who say this should have a chat with Pat Nash, a Christian Brothers educated Limerick man with a love of hurling and rugby, with very little background in the corridors of power in Brussels. Pat took a fairly traditional route in the 60’s becoming a cadet in the Irish Army, like many a few spells in the Lebanon followed. Pat climbed through the career structure focussing more on overseas missions.

In 2007 Lieutenant General Pat Nash became one of the most important people in European Security and Defence Policy. Of course two Irish people have in succession held the most senior positions in the European Commission but to have the commander of a major EU mission coming form a small neutral country was somewhat historic.

The political and military situation in Central Africa is complex and difficult. The whole world however spoke at one during 2007 saying that action was needed to deal with the situation in Darfur where millions of people were being displaced. Much of the impact of this was being felt in the neighbouring countries of Chad and The Central African Republic, both with their own internal problems.

The United Nations passed Resolution 1778 in September 2007 and both Chad and CAR requested assistance to deal with the situation. The resolution stressed the protection of civilians, aid organisations and the need to stabilise the security situation. Nash was faced with a huge challenge in putting together a force which eventually had forces form 26 countries including non EU countries, Albania, Russia and Croatia

The mission presented massive logistical and political difficulties all of which had to be resolved in double quick time. In a country about 6 times the size of Ireland there was 500km of proper road and practically zero infrastructure in terms of transport and air travel. While logistical miracles were performed many of the shortcomings in the EU security architecture were present such as the lack of a permanent OHQ, the absence of dedicated air lift capacity and sufficient dedicated medical support.

It was widely recognised as one of the most dangerous missions that Ireland had ever been involved with and a surge in rebel activity to the Chadian capital N’Djamane delayed the start by some weeks. The military patrols and operations were supported by economic development projects. From start to finish the mission was to last for one year until a U.N. mission could be assembled, the UN clearly recognised the EU’s ability to deploy more rapidly and effectively.

Interestingly Nash has commented that the civilian and democratic oversight of this mission was second to none and far superior to that seen in the United Nations. The mission has been recognised all around as being an enormous success particularly considering the huge risk and complexity involved. The United Nations have now taken on the longer term tasks in the area.

So this is the actual rather than the imagined reality of European Security and Defence Policy. I can’t see any of the militarism or large country dominance so often spoken of in Ireland. In the Political and Security Committee where all the major operational decisions are made Ireland has one vote the same as every other member state. The actual changes in security and defence policies in Lisbon are quite minor. The creation of a foreign minister (it’s not the term used in the treaty) is actually much more minor with the High Representative for Foreign Policy becoming a member of both the Council and Commission to bring the work of both bodies together. All major decisions remain to be made by unanimity.

The most striking thing about this whole area is the gulf between the reality and the fantasy. The EUFOR operation in Chad is only one of many and even a cursory glance at Bosnia, Kosovo and the Congo shows that the founding principles of the ESDP are being translated on the ground. So Yes campaigners must see security and defence policy as a plus not a minus in our approach to EU integration. The legal guarantees from our EU partners cement this view. The EDA is given legal standing in the Treaty and this is covered elsewhere on this site. Suffice it to say it will strengthen and improve this work and that must be welcomed by all.

http://www.raco.ie/signalpdfs/Signal_Sep_08/Command_and_Control.pdf

EU Supported Police in Kinshasa

For a number of people the European Defence Agency has become the bogey man of the Lisbon Treaty. Given the perceived complexity of the whole thing and perhaps due to the legally binding guarantees received by the Government this body provides an easy target after all it’s to do with guns and things so must be bad, right?

As with most aspects of European policy a closer examination provides a different picture. The European Defence Agency already exists having being established in 2004. The purpose of the Lisbon Treaty is to give a solid legal basis to the agency, rather like many agencies in Ireland which have existed on an administrative basis before been put on a statutory footing.

One of the big issues in the evolution of security and defence policy in the EU has been the difficulties in getting forces from several different countries to work together for example in peace-keeping missions in the Balkans. This can be down to different cultures, traditions and languages. However one of the main issues is the lack of interoperable equipment. This can lead to one set of communications systems not been compatible with another, troop transporters being unable to take equipment or radar or reconnaissance equipment not functioning correctly.

When we examine the historical tendency of cold war forces to be trained and orientated towards large scale battles on the plains of Europe as opposed to the inter ethnic strife that they have had to grapple with in the Balkans we can see that despite the rhetoric the EU is far form a military superpower. If it is to provide any assistance in solving conflict it needs to change. The entire point of defence and armaments co-operation in the EU is to address these problems, no more and no less.

Again as with all decisions of the EU the legal basis must be clear and the documentation establishing the EDA is available for all the see and read if they care to. The European Council acting under then Article 14 of the Treaty of European Union adopted Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP

On the 12th of July 2004.

The text of the founding document makes it clear that the EDA is subject to the Council of Ministers so cannot get involved in the military adventurism suggested by some. Such meetings will of course be totally open to the public on major matters should Lisbon be adopted.

Critically Article 2 of the founding document makes clear the mission of the Agency namely

“The mission of the Agency is to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the EU’s defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future”

The European Security and Defence Policy is again set out in the Treaties, at the heart of it are the Petersberg Tasks which prioritise peace-keeping and crisis management, areas where Ireland has a considerable background and involvement. Thus the entire role and function of the EDA is to support the EU missions, not wantonly to sell arms around the world. Irish troops serve in several ESDP missions with Dail approval and under a U.N. mandate. Thus the work of the EDA is of critical importance to Ireland and to our foreign policy which informs our participation in such missions.

The ESDP currently has a number of active missions where Irish troops serve and many former ones. For example the provision of policing and security services in Bosnia, Policing and monitoring missions in Kosovo and Georgia. The list goes on to include the Congo, Chad, The Palestinian Authority. One might well ask where is the war mongering here? All these missions involve recovering societies from conflict and providing a new start. They are generally aligned with generous aid packages. This is the essence of the EU’s approach to security policy. It is in support of these missions that we have an EDA.

As with many aspects of the Lisbon debate the Government has moved to reassure the public about a variety of issues. Many people who have followed the integration process for a number of years do not see a great need for this but if these reassurances effectively reaffirm what people knew already what harm. Media reports suggest that legislation on the EDA is to be one of these. Insofar as this makes it clear that as with all aspects of ESDP participation is voluntary, such reassurance are helpful.

The Defence Agency in co-ordinating the defence activities in the member states in the areas of procurement and joint projects can also create more efficiencies and value for money. Despite constant repetition this does not necessarily incur extra expenditure; in many areas it will simply mean a different type of expenditure. For example the reduction in infantry and tank based divisions in favour of smaller special forces to deal with urbanised ethnic conflict and force separation would probably mean less cost. A greater emphasis on technology and dual use resources such as tactical transporters and close air support may also create efficiencies.

The United Nations Brahimi report on peace keeping in 2000 placed a particular emphasis on devolving these duties to regional actors. The EU has taken up the challenge. The U.N. and peacekeeping is at the centre of Irish foreign policy. The EDA assists Europe’s and Ireland’s efforts in this area and is a positive rather than a negative aspect of the Lisbon Treaty.